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 1 
The European Union‖s role as a peace-building organisation is a significant theme 
in the literature on European integration and in the public discourse of the 
European Commission and leading European Politicians.
i
  The discourse of 
political and Commission elites in particular often conflates the historic experience 
of the early period of European integration, the claim that war is now 
―unthinkable‖ between major European allies with previously conflictual 
relationships, the European agreed ―security complex‖ and the EU‖s modern role in 
external affairs including the development of its foreign, security and defence 
policies.  While there is an extensive critical literature on the limited external 
engagement of the EU and the difficulties in agreeing a more comprehensive 
foreign and security policy, there has been less focus on the weakness of the EU in 
dealing with the limited number of intensive serious conflict within its own 
borders.  The limits of this literature combined with the strength of EU official 
discourse on the ―success‖ of European integration as a ―peace-building project‖ has 
led to an exaggerated role for the EU being assumed with consequent over 
ambitious hopes being set out for other regional organisations by external 
observers.   
 
In the case of SAARC, it is often repeated that the strong commitment to state 
sovereignty is a product of the relatively recent independence of states, compared 
to most EU members and that this combined with the relative weakness of 
SAARC, even compared to ASEAN and not only the EU, has made inter-state 
security rivalries more intense and peace-building more difficult, compared to the 
modern European experience.  As the focus of much of the literature is on its 
potential role in ongoing conflicts and inter-state tension within South Asia, this 
article examines the equivalent role of the EU on the Northern Ireland conflict and 
peace process – the nearest equivalent conflict within the EU – to any of the 
current conflicts within the borders of SAARC. 
 
Irish Foreign Minister Brian Cowen, explicitly referred to the frequency of the 
EU‖s claim to be a model, when saying ―It has been observed on many occasions 
that the European Union is one of the most successful examples of conflict 
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resolution the world has known‖.ii  While it might be left to historians to inquire 
into the causal directions involved in European peace, the Franco-German 
rapprochement and economic integration, this claim is often a prelude to an 
argument that the European experience is transferable to other regions and that its 
normative basis is a proven case study on the linkages between democratisation, 
economic integration, sovereignty-pooling and peace-building. 
 
Björn  Hettne, one of the world‖s most authoritative experts on regionalism, 
highlights the contradictions involved in this conflation.  He argues: 
 
The “second pillar” [of the original Treaty on European Union] is 
understood to encompass cooperation among the Member States in the 
foreign policy and security fields. It is mildly paradoxical that this 
cooperation is extremely sensitive and controversial, at the same time as the 
entire integration project is officially described as a historical peace project. 
Thus, security is described as the core of the EU project, but it seems instead 
to be an indirect effect of cooperation, which should not be seen in 
explicitly direct terms.
iii
 
 
Despite a healthy scepticism about the external foreign policy capacity of the EU, 
its role in creating inter-state peace is often left uncontested in comparative 
discussions about SAARC.
iv
  Even while the EU‖s external reach is dismissed, it is 
assumed to have played a central role in the sustaining of inter-state peace within its 
own borders.    
 
This paper explores the role of the European Union (and its predecessors the EC 
and EEC) in the Northern Ireland conflict and peace process as a case study analysis 
of the EU‖s role in conflict resolution within its own borders.  This conflict 
represented the longest running and bloodiest conflict within the borders of the 
EU, since its foundation.  The Northern Ireland case is a good case study, as 
because of its duration there were many opportunities for the EEC/EC/EU to 
intervene.  The conflict also varied over time in its intensity; it raised important 
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issues of state responsibility for human rights abuses; it included an inter-state 
dimension and finally saw a relatively successful peace process.
v
   
 
The International Context for the Northern Ireland Conflict 
 
Until the ending of the Cold War the international pressures on the British 
Government for a resolution of the Northern Ireland conflict were minimal.  
Neither superpower had any significant interest in intervening. The USSR saw 
little potential for using the conflict diplomatically beyond raising human rights 
issues as a trade off in forums such as the CSCE.  The USA was unwilling to 
challenge its most important NATO ally.  Despite the occasional high profile 
campaigning within the United states by non-governmental Irish-American 
organisations and pressure from the Irish embassy in Washington, US government 
policy on Northern Ireland was firmly constrained by the context of the ―special 
relationship‖ with Britain.vi  Northern Ireland was seen as an internal British affair 
and Irish governments were politely informed that the US administration would 
not intervene.
vii
  Even during crisis situations such as the major street protests of 
the civil rights period in the late 1960s and the 1981 hunger-strikes, where 10 IRA 
prisoners died on hunger strike in jail this policy held firm.
viii
  Other international 
interventions were equally low key. The UN Security Council was never likely to 
get involved as Britain held a permanent seat and a veto.  No other government, 
apart from the Irish and British had any national interests to pursue and so the only 
other state level intervention came from diplomatically isolated states such as Libya 
and Iran - with their own separate motives for attacking the British government.   
 
 
EEC / EC interventions during the Cold War 
 
Potential EEC / EU interventions on Northern Ireland need to be explored within 
this wider international context of non-intervention.  Just as Ireland was joining the 
then European Economic Community, Irish Foreign Minister and later Taoiseach 
(Prime Minister) Dr. Garret FitzGerald, who was a strong supporter of European 
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integration, set out what he believed to be the most important potential influences 
of EEC membership on the Northern Ireland conflict and on wider relations 
between the Irish and British Governments.
ix
  He believed there would be positive 
(if  not dramatic) impacts in a number of ways; at the ideological level he thought it 
would strengthen a more cosmopolitan form of politics; at a functionalist level he 
believed that it would promote north-south cooperation within Ireland on issues 
such as agriculture, which would then assist other more political developments and 
finally he argued it would change the nature of sovereignty more generally and 
lower the direct relevance of competing ethno-nationalist claims in Northern 
Ireland.  He did not seem to envisage any form of direct EC / EU involvement in 
the conflict.  These four potential areas of impact - ideological, direct intervention, 
functional and on the perceptions of sovereignty, provide a useful framework 
within which to explore the potential role of regional organisations in conflict 
resolution. 
 
 
Ideological and cultural impacts on the conflict 
There is now a very wide consensus among academics with otherwise different 
opinions on the Northern Ireland conflict that the ideological impact of the EU on 
identity and political nationalism has been very limited.  There are few signs in 
opinion polls, for example, in any EU member state, that the EU is a primary 
source of identity for citizens.  The EU‖s impact on politics has been in 
conjunction with state level politics and national identity politics and not a 
replacement for it. Indeed in Scotland there is clear evidence, over many years that 
EU membership (and continuing membership for an independent Scotland) has 
increased the number of Scottish people who would be willing to vote to leave the 
UK and establish an independent Scottish state, rather than diminishing the 
salience of Scottish nationalism.
x
  In Northern Ireland, there is no evidence of a 
reduction in the political salience of nationalism as the primary political divide. 
 
In elections throughout the conflict, voters overwhelmingly supported political 
parties whose primary appeal was ethno-national.  In effect there were two separate 
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party competition models.  The two major Irish nationalist parties – Sinn Féin and 
the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) competed in a relatively stable 
two-party system and between them received the support of well over 90% of all 
―cultural‖ Irish nationalists.  While Ulster unionists (those supporting the ―union‖ 
with Britain) ruled Northern Ireland with a single dominant party from 1922 until 
the late 1960s, since that time there have been at least two major unionist parties.  
However, in contrast to the Irish nationalist community, new parties have emerged 
over the years, sometimes attracting significant support for an election or two.  
However the two major parties – the Ulster Unionist Party and the Democratic 
Unionist Party have ultimately seen off all these challenges.  They represented over 
80% of unionist voters at the beginning of the modern conflict and do so once 
again at present. 
 
Only one party, the Alliance Party has maintained a permanent existence with any 
significant support through this period which defines itself outside of this 
framework.  However with about 7% support it is relatively marginal and while 
rejecting an ethno-national label it is, and also has been, a firm supporter of the 
union with Britain.  Other parties seeking support primarily on ground of class, 
gender or on environmental grounds have stood for election throughout the 
modern period but have received no substantial support. 
 
As the peace process developed, the strength of ethno-national identity may have 
strengthened rather than weakened.  Within the Irish nationalist community the 
more strongly nationalist and more left-wing Sinn Féin has displaced the more 
centrist SDLP as the dominant party.  Within unionism, the more populist and 
more militantly unionist DUP has likewise displaced the more centrist Ulster 
Unionist Party.  Interpreting this as a shift to the extremes is not necessarily 
accurate.  Sinn Féin was strongly associated with the IRA who were conducting an 
armed campaign against the British state.  Now they are in government, sharing 
power with unionists. However they are still clearly more strongly nationalist than 
their rivals in the SDLP.  What is certain is that neither the process of EU 
integration, nor the peace process since the 1990s, has significantly weakened the 
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underlying strength of ethno-nationalist identity and its framing of the political 
system. 
 
Direct Intervention      
There was no significant EEC / European Union institutional involvement in the 
conflict.
xi
  There was no direct involvement by either the European Commission or 
the Council of Ministers.  No other member state ever sought to raise the 
Northern Ireland conflict or had any strategic desire to.  There was and remains a 
limited legal basis in the Treaties for direct intervention and Britain was very 
hostile to any involvement whatsoever until the late 1980s at least.   
 
After the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979, there were more 
consistent interventions as Britain could not prevent discussion of the issue, given 
the more open procedures of the Parliament.  In 1980 the strongly nationalist Irish 
MEP Neil Blaney unsuccessfully called for an investigation by the Legal Affairs 
Committee of the parliament into human rights issues in Northern Ireland.  Some 
Irish MEPs from the government parties supported another attempt in 1981 to 
raise the then on-going hunger strike by IRA prisoners, but it is not clear if the 
Irish government exerted any diplomatic effort on the issue.  The amended 
resolution reinforced the limited powers of the then EC with the phrase 
′recognizing that the European Community has no competence to make proposals 
for changes in the Constitution of NI‖.xii  There were individual motions on human 
rights issues over the following years, passed with Irish government support and in 
the face of British government opposition, though often supported by individual 
left-wing British MEPs.  The most significant diplomatic initiative was in February 
1983 when the parliament decided that its political affairs committee should 
conduct an investigation into the political and economic affairs of Northern 
Ireland.  The British Government made what even they in hindsight recognised as a 
diplomatic blunder by condemning the move, calling it interference in their 
internal affairs and refusing to cooperate.  The ultimate report, with Niels 
Haagerup MEP as rapporteur, was rather bland and simply called for the 
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establishment of joint British-Irish responsibilities in a number of specified fields, 
―politically, legally and otherwise‖.xiii  
 
Other EU Parliament interventions included the passing of two motions calling for 
a ban on the use of anti-riot ―plastic bullets‖ in 1982 and 1984, following the deaths 
of a number 14 people, including 9 children, mostly in disputed circumstances.
xiv
 
The Parliament also called for an inquiry into the operations of the UK‖s anti-
terrorism legislation and called for the re-opening of high profile cases of 
individuals jailed under anti-terrorist legislation and widely believed to be innocent.  
Guelke argues that while such resolutions had no legal impact in the UK they did 
have a political impact, in that they increased Ireland‖s international status and vis-
a-vis the UK and strengthen their claim to have a formal role in Northern Ireland.
xv
  
These initiatives by the European Parliament also established a precedent of 
international/EU involvement and created some international pressure on the 
British Government to cooperate more fully with the Irish government.  It is this 
informal pressure which was the EU‖s main contribution rather than any formal 
role and this is discussed more fully in the section on functional cooperation.  
 
The limited role of the EU however meant that Irish diplomacy primarily looked 
elsewhere for international support and that was also reflected in the peace process 
and the Good Friday Agreement.  Even during the Cold War there was no serious 
attempt to utilise the Northern Ireland question for strategic purposes.  Guelke 
refers to a general mood in the international system which favoured the Irish 
Government over the United Kingdom, but this rarely led to any concrete action, 
not least because there was little which most states could do.
xvi
  The only states 
seeking to utilise the conflict to attack British interests were states which were 
already marginalised such as post-Revolution Iran or Libya.  No Irish government 
welcomed their interest and even guerrilla movements, who had sympathy for Sinn 
Féin such as the PLO or ANC kept the contacts at a low and discrete level as their 
own cause would have been damaged by any serious public links with the IRA.   
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Irish governments did however make significant efforts, especially from the 1980s 
onwards to mobilise members of the United States Congress who had Irish roots or 
were sympathetic to the Irish government‖s position.  During the Cold War it was 
difficult to make progress, as the importance of the United States-United Kingdom 
special relationship in international affairs placed significant limits on what was 
possible and such influence rarely went beyond individual members of Congress.  
The US State Department remained a staunch ally of the British position and US 
President‖s always prioritised the ―special relationship‖ with their strongest ally 
within NATO.    
 
There were occasional signs of a countervailing view, such as with United States 
President Jimmy Carter‖s St Patrick‖s Day statement in 1978, expressing an interest 
in involvement, the first such statement by an American President.  More strongly 
he introduced a ban on arms sales to the Royal Ulster Constabulary (the RUC, the 
police force in Northern Ireland).  President Ronald Reagan also raised Northern 
Ireland directly and in private with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, 
expressing a hope that talks then beginning with the Irish Government would be 
successful.   There were also constant non-governmental organization (NGO) 
criticisms of British policy in Northern Ireland, but the level of international 
pressure was never enough to have a significant impact.   
 
It was the involvement of United States President Bill Clinton in active and 
supportive involvement in the process, which marked the first serious international 
pressure on the British government with regard to Northern Ireland. US visas for 
Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams and IRA leader Joe Cahill were crucial confidence-
building measures in the run-up to the IRA cease-fire.  Partly this was the outcome 
of a long process of engagement, by Irish Governments, in particular with Irish 
Americans in the United States Congress, seeking to build support for a more 
active United States involvement on the issue.  The ending of the Cold War opened 
up greater possibilities for international involvement in the conflict. It weakened 
the importance of the United States relationship with the United Kingdom—a 
crucial factor, as the United States was the only international actor likely to be able 
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to exert influence on the United Kingdom.
xvii
  Northern Ireland was a low-risk 
intervention for the United States, but it did involve President Clinton in serious 
tension with an ally—to the extent that British Prime Minister John Major refused 
to take his phone calls—and the visa decision was taken against the advice of almost 
the entire foreign policy, defence and intelligence establishment.
xviii
   
 
While the new world order permitted President Clinton‖s intervention, it did not 
prompt it. For motivations, it is necessary to look at the domestic pressure on 
Clinton.
xix
 His party needed to win back Irish Americans, who had become part of 
the Reagan-Democrat bloc. Clinton himself needed the Irish vote to win the 
Democratic primary and it was before the crucial New York primary, with its large 
and well organized Irish American vote, that he made his public commitments on 
the ―Irish‖ issue. He was also under pressure from a much more professional and 
influential Irish American lobby, itself partly a response to the changing strategy of 
Sinn Féin in Ireland, where better working relationships with other nationalists 
were being sought.  
 
The fact that the President of the United States had chosen to become personally 
involved in the later talks, at a level beyond anything required by his electoral 
needs, increased the pressure on political actors to reach agreement and, as 
nationalists had least interest in accepting the status quo, this intervention favoured 
nationalists (as they wanted change), even if the process of intervention was even-
handed, which it was.  This quiet pressure on Britain to make greater efforts to 
come to a joint approach with the Irish Government was crucial in strengthening 
Irish diplomacy and in building a dynamic towards agreement.    
        
The scale of the direct US involvement in the peace process, manifested in the 
direct involvement of President Clinton; in his appointment of Senator George 
Mitchel as an envoy; in Senator Mitchell‖s later chairing of the peace negotiations 
leading to the 1998 Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement; in the involvement of senior 
US appointments in various commissions dealing with policing, the 
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decommissioning of weapons, the monitoring of ceasefires etc shows a level of 
involvement far beyond anything the EU could do at this level. 
 
Other international factors were also significant for the peace process. ―Struggles‖ 
that the Sinn Féin leadership had drawn inspiration from or sought to compare 
themselves with in South Africa, Palestine and Central America seemed like they 
were moving towards peace negotiations in the early 1990s.
xx
 Though the IRA did 
not face significant financial or military material losses they were affected by the 
political climate that these developments created and were part of. At an ideological 
level and, in the case of South Africa, at the level of extensive personal contacts the 
emergence of international peace processes had a significant impact on republican 
thinking, a process of influence that Sinn Féin then played in the Basque conflict.
xxi
 
 
Prior to the end of the Cold War, unionists by virtue of their siege mentality had 
made limited use of international contacts. Such parallels as were drawn tended to 
be with what were perceived as similar communities under siege, such as Israel, 
Turkish Cypriots, apartheid South Africa or other ―abandoned‖ British settlers, 
such as the white community in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe.
xxii
 Such comparisons were 
clearly damaging by the 1990s and unionists could not credibly argue that the 
conflict was a purely internal ―British‖ matter once the British Government 
accepted US and Irish government involvement.
xxiii
 However unionists were 
undoubtedly pleased with the election of George W. Bush as US President and the 
lower level of engagement it promised, but their general distrust of any 
international involvement was seen after ―9/11‖ when they made no serious attempt 
in the USA to try and use the new environment to damage Sinn Féin. 
 
Even if direct involvement is extended from EU institutions to prominent 
European politicians or personalities the level of involvement is still relatively 
limited compared to the US or even Canada and South Africa.  In the 1990‖s when 
the UK Government, reflecting some internal political developments in Britain as 
well as in Northern Ireland; a much improved British-Irish relationship and under 
some pressure from the US administration, accepted some international 
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involvement, the individuals involved came from the USA, South Africa, Canada 
and Finland.  The most obvious example is Martti Ahtisaari, former President of 
Finland, who played a role along with senior ANC official Cyril Ramaphosa in 
confirming the secure containment of IRA arms before they were ultimately 
destroyed by the IRA itself.    None represented the EU.  Martti Ahtisaari, though 
an EU national was selected based on Finland‖s tradition of neutrality and his 
experience in the Balkans, rather than as any sort of defacto EU representative.  
However in other key areas of the negotiations or the various international 
commissions advising on different elements of the post-Agreement transformation, 
the parties and governments looked beyond the EU and Europe for involvement. 
 
The above review of the international, especially US involvement in the Northern 
Ireland case is discussed to provide a context for the relative absence of EU 
initiatives.  The Northern Ireland case included important international 
interventions, which were absolutely essential to its success.  However the EU was 
relatively uninvolved in this type of initiative.  However, while the EU had a very 
limited role in the politics and diplomacy of the peace process they did provide 
substantial financial resources in the aftermath of the 1998 agreement, aimed at 
building support for the process by showing an immediate socio-economic 
dividend, which more easily fitted within the more functional cooperation which 
has characterised the EU – rather than direct intervention.    
 
 
Functional Cooperation  
Early theories of European integration focused significantly on the long term 
impact of functional cooperation.  ―Neo-functional‖ theories of integration are 
premised on the notion of spill-over, whereby cooperation and integration on 
lower level, or less controversial areas gradually lead to further and deeper 
cooperation and integration. It was argued that this happened in a number of ways.  
Technical cooperation in one area led to requirements in other domains.  For 
example, a single market in goods led to demand for European regulations on the 
environment or safety to avoid social dumping from one country into another.  It 
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was also argued that political and administrative elites who saw the benefits of 
integration would use their position to deepen integration.
xxiv
    Neo-functionalism 
has been criticised both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically it is critiqued 
for underestimating the enduring strength of states and for implying a direction of 
causation which is open to other interpretations.  Empirically the predictions of 
functionalists are limited at best.  In the area of security, extensive economic 
cooperation has not resulted in any significant EU progress. 
 
Nonetheless despite the widespread academic critiques of EU models of 
functionalism, in a very broad sense it is a widely accepted short-hand for the post 
war European narrative.  Therefore when proposals were made during the early 
stages of the Northern Ireland peace process for greater economic cooperation 
across the Irish border, unionist politicians reacted negatively, using an explicitly 
functionalism model to argue that if they agreed to such ―low level‖ cooperation 
they would open the door to political integration.  Harold McCusker, Deputy 
leader of the Ulster Unionist Party opposing the 1973 power-sharing agreement in 
Northern Ireland, said it ―was designed not to kick us out of the United Kingdom 
but to change our attitudes, to swing our gaze slowly from the centre of power we 
have always recognised as London towards Dublin and by a slow process, to change 
the attitude of the Loyalist people so that one day they might believe the myth of 
Irish unity which so bedevils many people in Northern Ireland.‖xxv In a very similar 
vein 22 years later unionist member of the British parliament, Robert McCartney, 
speaking about the peace process, argued that ―there is no such thing in the 
Nationalist dictionary of concepts as a permanent settlement. All settlements, all 
concessions, all agreements are merely staging posts in a process. Nationalists are 
not interested in a settlement, they are interested only in generating a process that 
will ensure their ultimate objective of Irish unity‖.xxvi  He opposed economic co-
operation by arguing that ―arrangements are being made to create an economic 
infrastructure that would ultimately make the giving of ... consent to a united 
Ireland the only answer to economic destruction‖.xxvii  On the nationalist side the 
centrist SDLP and in particular their dominant leader for many years John Hume, 
also believed in the power of functional cooperation to deliver wider political 
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progress.  Sinn Féin opposed this view during the conflict as part of their wider 
critique of EU integration, but interestingly during the peace process they also 
promoted the idea of economic cooperation leading to greater integration.
xxviii
       
 
Despite the strong local belief in functionalist theorising on both sides of the 
Northern Ireland divide, there is limited evidence of the impact of functional 
cooperation on issues with low levels of political controversy on more 
controversial issues. This was not the underlying dynamic of the peace process.  
Higher levels of cooperation within Northern Ireland across the political divide, 
and between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, has followed the peace 
agreement, it did not precede it in any significant form.  The time scale for analysis 
is therefore very limited and its long term impact is hopeful but uncertain and 
untested.  It is however true that cooperation between the Republic and Northern 
Ireland has grown since the 1998 Agreement, but its institutionalisation is still at a 
very undeveloped stage. 
 
The strongest evidence of the positive impact of EU membership on the Northern 
Ireland conflict is in the improved relations between the British and Irish states.  
The EEC was the first international institution where the UK was required to 
engage with Ireland on a fully equal basis and where they often needed an Irish vote 
on the Council of Ministers.  The EU also created opportunities for quiet side-
meetings away from the glare of publicity, it normalised the relationship between 
the two states by creating a requirement for interaction on issues other than 
Northern Ireland.  In 1968-69 as the conflict erupted, there was no structure for 
regular meetings between the two governments.  Attempts by the Irish government 
to offer advice were rebuffed and requests for meetings refused, as Northern Ireland 
was defined as a purely internal matter by the British government.  While it took 
some time for a relationship to build by the early 1990s as the peace process 
developed, regular meetings between Irish and British prime ministers, cabinet 
ministers and senior officials were totally routine.  There were still of course 
differences of opinion, strongly expressed at times, but there was a channel to 
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discuss them and the regularity of meetings at European level played an important 
part in this change.
xxix
 
 
The other domain in which an influence from EU cooperation can be seen is in the 
institutional structures set out in the 1998 Agreement.  The Belfast Agreement 
includes a North-South Ministerial Council between the Government of Ireland 
and the Northern Ireland Executive which is modelled at least loosely on the EU 
Council of Ministers.  The existence of such a model potentially made the Irish 
version seem less unique and perhaps a little more acceptable to the British 
Government.   These cross-border institutions were crucial to gaining Sinn Féin 
approval for the 1998 agreement.  A purely internal (to Northern Ireland) 
institutional structure would not have been acceptable to Irish nationalists, 
however strong the internal equality and power-sharing dimensions.  If they were 
not to achieve a united Ireland and if they were to accept that a majority within 
Northern Ireland would have to agree to future constitutional change, then 
nationalists insisted that in return they would have their political identity 
enshrined in a cross border structure.  
 
 
Sovereignty 
The fourth area where FitzGerald predicted a possible EEC influence on the 
Northern Irish conflict was in the impact which European integration would have 
on conceptions of sovereignty.  FitzGerald assumed that a more integrated Europe 
would require governments and ultimately European peoples to shift their vision of 
sovereignty away from a Westphalian absolutist view towards a more multi-layered 
concept.  This would assist the Northern Ireland case he believed, because in a 
traditional view of state sovereignty the Northern Ireland conflict would always be 
zero-sum; any acknowledgement of Irish sovereignty was only possible with an 
equivalent weakening of British sovereignty.  In essence only one state could ―own‖ 
Northern Ireland.  It was either sovereign British territory or not.  This view was 
summed up by former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher when she asserted 
that Northern Ireland was ―as British as Finchley‖ – her own English constituency.   
 15 
 
If a traditional view of sovereignty is taken, then there is little evidence that British 
conceptions of sovereignty altered during the conflict.  UK governments 
throughout the period went to great lengths to assert their sovereign authority and 
the UK refused to acknowledge a legitimate interest by the EU in the dispute for as 
long as the conflict continued.  On the human rights front the European Court of 
Human Rights occasionally made significant interventions, especially in the 1970s, 
but the British government always reserved its ―sovereign‖ right to reject the court‖s 
view and proclaim an exemption from its findings, based on the security 
situation
xxx.  The 1985 Agreement between the Irish and British Government‖s is 
occasionally seen as the beginning of a shift in the British position, as the UK 
government agreed to some role for the Irish government in managing the conflict.  
However it is couched in very minimalist terms. It states that ―The United 
Kingdom Government accept that the Irish Government will put forward views 
and proposals on matters relating to Northern Ireland‖ and ―the Irish Government 
may, where the interests of' the minority community are significantly or especially 
affected, put forward views on proposals for major legislation and on major policy 
issues‖.xxxi It was not possible for the Irish government to have their right to do so 
formally acknowledged at that time, the British government simply accepted that 
the Irish government would do this!  Indeed it was not even possible to agree the 
title of the agreement, so there are two separate front covers.  The Irish version is 
between ―The Government of Ireland and the Government of The United 
Kingdom‖, as the formal name of the Irish state is ―Ireland‖ and not ―Republic of 
Ireland‖.  The British Government will not use this term arguing it implies all of 
Ireland, and so their version of the 1985 agreement is between ―the Government of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government 
of the Republic of Ireland‖.  This short detour into the detail of inter-governmental 
relations is to highlight, how as late as 1985, there was no weakening of the 
absolutist view of sovereignty as expressed by the British government. 
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It is in this context that the 1998 agreement is interesting, at least at the margins.  
There is no overturning of British sovereignty as the agreement states, that the 
parties:  
(iii) acknowledge that while a substantial section of the people in Northern 
Ireland share the legitimate wish of a majority of the people of the island of 
Ireland for a united Ireland, the present wish of a majority of the people of 
Northern Ireland, freely exercised and legitimate, is to maintain the Union 
and, accordingly, that Northern Ireland‖s status as part of the United 
Kingdom reflects and relies upon that wish; and that it would be wrong to 
make any change in the status of Northern Ireland save with the consent of 
a majority of its people;
xxxii
  
 
However this is not an absolute assertion of British sovereignty.  It both 
acknowledges the ―legitimate‖ wish of Irish nationalists and accepts that British rule 
is conditional on a local majority.  It is also interesting that the annex to the wider 
agreement setting out the intergovernmental aspects, uses a common form 
―Government of Ireland‖ in all versions – moving on form the 1985 stand-off on 
terminology.  Other interesting aspects of the 1998 agreement on sovereignty 
include the fact that there is no requirement on Irish nationalist ministers in the 
Northern Ireland Executive to formally support British sovereignty, to hold UK 
passports or make any declaration of loyalty to the British state.      
 
The EU as framework to explore SAARC 
 
The above analysis of four potential impacts of a regional organisation on a conflict 
internal to the region – identity and ideological shifts, direct intervention, 
functionalist impacts and changing concepts of sovereignty - is a useful way of 
categorising the different potential impacts of SAARC.  As the discussion above 
sets out, in the Northern Ireland case the impacts of the EU have not been as 
significant as might have been assumed.  There is no evidence of any significant 
change in national identity and political ideology in response to European 
integration.  While there were very important direct external interventions in the 
peace process, the EU as an institution was not involved, apart from as a funder 
after the ceasefires.  Functionalist shifts did not have the predicted impact of 
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making cooperation less controversial before the ceasefires but EU meetings did 
play a very important role in building a more normal working relationship 
between the Irish and British governments, their ministers and officials.  The EU 
model may also have played a small role as an example in providing a model for 
post Agreement cross border co-operation.  Finally the EU itself did not impact on 
UK conceptions of sovereignty during the conflict.  However there are parallel 
changes in the 1998 agreement, where some more flexible conceptions of 
sovereignty are utilised in cross border bodies and on the absence of requirements 
for declarations of loyalty to the state. 
     
The Northern Ireland experience is also not unique.  The second most serious 
armed conflict within the EU borders, in the Basque country, saw an even more 
limited EU role.  The EU could not even provide an informal forum, as France 
never sought to play an active role and the Basques therefore had no access, even at 
one remove, to this type of meeting.  The Spanish state has been just as defensive of 
its absolute sovereignty on the matter as were the UK in Northern Ireland.  This 
was re-enforced after the recent ETA ceasefire when the Spanish state rejected 
absolutely any suggestion of an international monitoring group to confirm the 
ETA ceasefire.  Therefore even though the EUs role was limited it was more 
pronounced in Northern Ireland than in the Basque case.  The Irish experience and 
indeed the Basque one within the EU where external intervention was even more 
limited, therefore suggests that we should not set too high an ambition for SAARC 
in regional conflicts such as that in Kashmir.  Looking at the four categories of 
anticipated impacts for the EU in Northern Ireland is still however a useful way of 
exploring the potential impacts of SAARC on the Kashmir dispute. 
 
Cultural and Ideological 
There is no reason to believe that SAARC can have any significant impact on 
political ideology or ethno-national and cultural identities in Kashmir.  This was 
the aspect of the EU experience where there is least evidence of any impacts.  There 
is no reason to believe that SAARC would have a greater impact in a more difficult 
underlying situation. 
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Direct Intervention 
There is no likelihood of SAARC playing a direct role in the conflict.  Just as the 
UK had the capacity to prevent any significant EU role in Northern Ireland, so too 
would India and Pakistan be able to prevent SAARC playing any role which they 
opposed.  Given India‖s long-standing opposition to any external intervention and 
Pakistan‖s fears of the dominance of SAARC by India because of its size SAARC 
does not seem a likely candidate for a formal role.  Just as in Northern Ireland, 
only external actors with considerable power, such as the USA, have the capacity 
to play a mediating or even a facilitating role.  If a peace process was more advanced 
other states might play a role on specific issues.  The EU has some experience of 
advising on judicial reform and oversight for example.  A number of countries 
might be acceptable in police oversight.  At this point in the conflict cycle however 
the EU case suggests that a regional organisation to which one or all the conflict 
parties belong does not have the capacity to play a stronger role. 
 
Functional Cooperation 
It is in the area of functional cooperation that SAARC is likely to have its strongest 
impact and that is more likely to be in the informal arena, rather than with grandly 
announced initiatives.  Certainly a better bilateral relationship between India and 
Pakistan will be essential if either SAARC is to develop or if the Kashmir dispute is 
to be resolved.  However in a classic chicken and egg situation it is difficult to 
advance SAARC or other confidence building measures while relations are so poor.   
 
The fringes of SAARC meetings may provide a useful informal meeting point for 
India and Pakistan, as a place where meetings already take place and could do so 
more easily without the full glare of publicity and expectations of a bilateral 
summit.  Confidence building measures are certainly needed, but are also difficult 
to advance in the absence of a political commitment to seek a resolution on terms 
acceptable to all sides.  Confidence building measures are not an alternative to 
political leadership and will do nothing unless there is a political will to move 
forward, but once that will exists, SAARC, its agreements and other bilateral 
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measures, will assist in building momentum in favour of a peace process and assist 
in building a dynamic of short term gains, which sustain a process through difficult 
times and through periods where the long term gains are not easy to see for people 
at community level. 
 
Sovereignty 
The EU experience also suggests that the strong focus on state sovereignty from 
India and Pakistan is not necessarily a barrier to progress and certainly the UK was 
equally strong on this issue up until the 1990s, when some international (but not 
EU) interventions were accepted in the Northern Ireland case and some innovative 
institutional solutions and the use of international commissions were included in 
the 1998 agreement.  Nothing SAARC is likely to do in the foreseeable future is 
going to alter the strong state-centric view of sovereignty held by the Indian and 
Pakistan states.  It is also very unlikely that there will be any change in the defacto 
border along the Line of Control.  However it is equally true that any solution 
likely to be acceptable to Kashmiri opinion will need to include some degree of 
(power-sharing) autonomy from New Delhi and indeed Islamabad.  There is scope 
within a strengthened Article 370 of the Indian constitution however to grant such 
autonomy in a manner, which even if unusual in its extent by international 
standards, would be acceptable to India.  If such an agreement was reached between 
India and Kashmiri political groups, including declared separatists it would be 
difficult for Pakistan to refuse a similar devolution of power to Muzaffarabad.  An 
agreed solution will also need to create an opening of the frontier and some 
linkages between the two parts of Kashmir.  The UK‖s ultimate flexibility on this 
issue, was crucial in getting Irish nationalist consent to the 1998 agreement in 
Northern Ireland. For nationalists it represented a recognition of their political 
sovereignty, but again in a manner acceptable to the UK.  This particular aspect is 
one where the sovereignty aspects of the Northern Ireland case are relevant even if 
the EU was not central to that change. 
 
Conclusion 
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The case study of EU influence in the Northern Ireland conflict and peace process 
suggests that ambitions for SAARC should not be too high.  It can play a role, in 
particular in facilitating a regular and at times informal dialogue between Indian 
and Pakistan at ministerial and official level.  It can assist a process of gradual 
confidence building, but the EU experience suggest that while a process of 
improved informal relations needs to precede a wider political agreement, 
confidence building measures will follow on from a renewed peace process and 
agreement not in itself create momentum.  The Kashmir dispute requires a 
strengthen dialogue between India and Pakistan and between both governments 
and Kashmiri political representatives.  The EU experience suggests that regional 
organisations play a limited role in that difficult task.      
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